Cybersecurity: quis custodiet ipsos custodes

This article caught my eye this morning. The first clear example I've seen, beyond glib soundbytes, of a prominent politician opposing an increase in government monitoring powers. The article includes quotes from Boris Johnson (mayor of London) and David Cameron (UK Prime Minister) justifying reasons for increased govt monitoring of its population.

The phrase 'in principle' seems to abound in such discussions. With good reason. I don't think anyone opposes the notion that all terrorists should be monitored closely. The trouble, for the government security people, is that they don't know who all the terrorists are, and by the time they know it's usually too late: membership is typically indicated by the wearing of explosives and/or the bearing of automatic rifles. So the simplest solution advocated by government security people is to allow them to monitor all communication, even the encrypted stuff. Fine in principle (if you're not a terrorist), but it has some severe practical issues.

The most often cited issue is privacy.
"What right does the government have to spy on me?" says Disgusted of Tunbridge Wells.
It's irrelevant.
If your neighbour was a terrorist then I'm sure that you'd advocate that they have every right, along with the right to hang them. In order to mitigate acts of terrorism government security people need the capability to intercept terrorist communications. So the issue is not the powers, it's the use of those powers or, more specifically, the potential for abuse of those powers.

Who watches the watchmen?
That's the translation of the latin in the title (taken from Juvenal's Satires). Evidently this is an issue as old as civilisation - arguably, a defining attribute of civilisation. By advocating such surveillance powers, a government is asking its demos, its populace, to trust it. It is implying that it is not interested in your personal life: your medical or financial history, your tax returns, your infidelities or predilections. Just your security. And, in principle, it may be right. But in practice, the government is nothing more than a body of individuals, with personal agendas, of whom significantly less than 10% are publicly elected. Who is to say that my information will categorically not be abused?

If democratic governments are serious about requiring the powers to intercept (even encrypted) communications, they need to demonstrate how they plan to protect those powers from abuse. So far, there seems to be a suspicious reluctance to do so.